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Education in public schools is considered by many to furnish desirable and even essential training for citizenship, apart from that gained by the study of books. The
association with those of all classes of society, at an early age and upon a common
level, is not unreasonably urged as a preparation for discharging the duties of a citizen.
The object of the school laws is not only to protect the state from the consequences of
ignorance, but also to guard against the dangers of incompetent citizenship.ss

TRADE DISPARAGEMENT AND THE "SPECIAL
DAMAGE" QUAGMIRE
"During all his years in public life Harry Truman never bothered to have
his portrait painted. Recently, however, as President, he sat for artist Jay Wesley Jacobs. The result, Truman's first portrait, is shown here." So claimed Life
magazine for November 26, 1945. But it appeared that Harry Truman's first
portrait had been painted in January 1945 by artist Larry Pendleton, and was
not that reproduced in Life. An agreement between Life and Pendleton to feature that portrait had not materialized. Plaintiff Pendleton brought suit in
Illinois alleging the falsity of the statements and that defendant, notwithstanding knowledge of the falsity, maliciously published said statements with
intent to injure plaintiff and plaintiff's reputation as an artist. He claimed
damage in the sum of $ioo,ooo.oo. A motion to dismiss was sustained in the
lower court but reversed on appeal., Plaintiff possessed a "property right in the
value attained in the painting of the 'first' portrait of Harry S. Truman... ,"
and since an "injury to plaintiff's property right was willfully, maliciously and
intentionally committed by defendant, there must be a remedy for this wrong
to the plaintiff.' 2 The court required no allegation and proof of "special" damage. But the dissent saw the action as one of "disparagement" and, surveying
the authorities, found that "the publication of falsehoods disparaging the
merits, quality, utility or value of another's property is not actionable unless
the plaintiff has suffered special damage and pecuniary loss as a direct and natural result of the publication."3 Finding insufficient allegation of "special"
damage,4 the dissent thought that the complaint should have been dismissed.
and of what constitutes public policy, are not subject to review by the courts. Cremer v. Peoria
Housing Authority, 399 Ill.
579, 78 N.E. 2d 276 (1948); People v. Eakin, 383 Ill. 383, 5o N.E,
2d 474

(1943)-

S3State

v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 Ati. 170 (1929).
xPendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill.
App. x88, 89 N.E. 2d 435 (1949).
2Ibid., at 194 and 438.
3 Ibid. See authorities cited notes 13, i5,i6 infra.
4 The allegations of damage stated that plaintiff lost all benefit and advantage accruing to
him by reason of his having painted the first portrait of Harry Truman, that plaintiff was
made to appear as having false claim to the painting of the first portrait, that plaintiff lost all
value in the rights of reproduction of his painting as the first portrait, and that plaintiff lost
the commission to do portraits of other prominent persons. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill.
App. i88, i9o, 89 N.E. 2d 435, 437-38 (1949).
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In recent years courts have been confronted with a growing number of "disparagement" actions. In the typical situation the plaintiff is injured in his business or business reputation by false and usually "malicious" utterances to third
persons, by word of mouth, or, more commonly, by the printed word.5 Throughout the cases there is confusion as to the nature of the harm sustained by the
plaintiff as well as doubt concerning what allegation and proof of damage is to
be required. Redress is made to hinge on the presence or absence of the requirement of allegation and proof of "special" damage. 6 This requirement in turn
depends upon whether the action obtains judicial recognition as disparagement
("special" damage required but unevenly applied) ;7 as libel or slander affecting
one in his business or trade (damage presumed) ;' as slander or libel not actionable per se ("special" damage required) ;9 or as malicious interference with the
property right in trade (no "special" damage required)x ° An examination of
these categories not only indicates how "thin partitions do their realms divide,"
but casts new doubt on the validity and utility of the troublesome "general""special" damage distinction-so basic to defamation law.
A modem definition of disparagemen-t holds: "The publication of false statements disparaging the plaintiff's title to his property, or its quality, or the character or conduct of his business, is actionable if it results in special damage in
the form of pecuniary loss due to the refusal of others to deal with him."" What
s Cases cited notes 17, 28, 34, 38 infra.
6 Redress may similarly hinge on other requirements that vary with the categories, such as
the availability of injunctive relief, statute of limitations period, survival statutes, and presumption of falsity. None of these issues compare in importance with the requirement as to
allegation and proof of damage-an integral part of the cause of action. The injunction issue
has, however, received considerable litigation. Because of the kinship of disparagement to defamation and the issue of freedom of speech, it was long the law that injunctions would not lie;
see Green, Relational Interests, 3o Ill. L. Rev. I, 39-45 (i935); Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 64o (i915). More recently
some courts have permitted the enjoining of disparaging publications; see Jurisdiction of
Equity over Libels Affecting Trade, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 258 (1926). In so doing, courts tend
to emphasize interference with property rights and "unfair competition," and are ignoring the
requirement of "special" damage; see Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, io6 F. 2d 229
(C.A. ioth, i939); Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 6oo, II So. 2d 383 (1943); Black &
Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. 2d 227 (C.A. 3d, 194); Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American
Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923).
7 Cases cited notes 17, 28, 35 infra.
9 Cases cited note 38 infra.
8 Cases cited note 35 infra.
'- Cases cited note 45 infra.
11Prosser, Torts io36 (194i); see Rest., Torts §§ 624-52 (x938); Bower, Actionable Defamation Art. 61 (19o8); Salmond, Law of Torts § i5o (9th ed., 1936); Smith, Disparagement of
Property, 13 Col. L. Rev. 13 (i9r3); Wham, Disparagement of Property, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 26
(1926); Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statement and Disparagement, ig Corn. L.Q. 63
(1933). Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement? 24 Minn. L. Rev. 625 (194o); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (i94o); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L.
Rev. X75 (1936); Wood, Disparagement of Title and Quality, 20 Can. Bar Rev. 296 (1942);
Slander of Title, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 370 (1941); Injurious Falsehood, 28 Corn. L.Q. 226
(r943); Injury to Trade Relations by a Non-Competitor, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 66i (947). Salmond
and Prosser view the tort as somewhat broader than indicated in the text and term it "in-
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is said to distinguish this tort from defamation is the absence of injury to plaintiff's reputation-"the essence of defamatory matter."'' In disparagement the
plaintiff must prove the disparaging character of the statements, their com3
munication to third persons, their falsity, and "special" damage in all cases.'
The requirement of "special" damage here means that in pleadings and proof
"the plaintiff must identify the particular purchasers who have refrained from
dealing with him, and specify the transactions of which he claims to have been
deprived."'4 In the tort's infancy as "slander of title," where plaintiff's title to
land had been impugned so that he could not dispose of it to prospective purchasers, 5 the requirement could be easily met. But today where it is typically
plaintiff's business custom that is alienated, the nile encounters criticism. 6 It
is manifestly impossible, where customers are infuturo, unknown and numerous,
to plead and prove each specific loss. Yet such is what the courts appear to
7
require.1
Inroads have been made upon the arbitrary characterization of "special"
damage. In I892 in Ratcliffe v. Evans, Bowen, L. J., treated the concept sensibly when he said: "As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on both
in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done.
To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist
upon more would be the vainest pedantry.",' For the most part these words
went unheeded by the American courts, bui recently some courts, pressed by
jurious falsehood." "It is an actionable wrong maliciously to make a false statement respecting
any person with the result that other persons deceived thereby are induced to act in a manner
which causes loss to him." Salmond, Law of Torts at 553 (9 th ed., i936).
1,Bower, Actionable Defamation at 240(y) (19o8). Salmond, Law of Torts, at 553 says:
"Both in defamation and injurious falsehood the defendant is liable because he has made a
false and hurtful statement respecting the plaintiff; but in one case the statement is an attack
upon his reputation, and in the other it is not."
'3 Prosser, Torts 1o4r-43 (94i); Bower, Actionable Defamation, art. 61(3) (19o8); Smith,
Disparagement of Property, 13 Col. L. Rev. 13, 129-31 (1913); Salmond, Law of Torts 555
(9th ed., 1936). Malice is frequently said to be essential to the action but it appears rather to
mean the absence of privilege. Prosser at io43; Smith at 21, 139; Salmond at 555; Bower at
244-46; see Disparagement or Slander of Title, 22 Can. Bar Rev. 471 (1944).
14Prosser, Torts 1045 (1941); see cases cited note 17 infra and in Smith, Disparagement of
Property, 13 Col. L. Rev. 13, 121-24 (913).
sSee Bower, Actionable Defamation 240-41 (y) (19o8).

16Prosser, Torts io45 (1941); Green, Relational Interests, 30 111. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 (1935).
.7 Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 11.30, 245 N.W. 231 (i932);
Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 1o4 Pac. 769 (igog); Ward v. Gee, 61
S.W. 2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933); Towerv. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N.Y. Supp. 219
(1925); but see Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F. 2d 255
(C.A. 8th, 1926).
1 [18921 2 Q.B. 524, 532-33. The court held that allegation and proof of loss of business following the disparagement was sufficient, where the custom was numerous and unknown.
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the otherwise resulting injustice, have looked to the Ratcliffe v. Evans rule, 9 or,

while giving lip-service to the "special" damage requirement, have granted
relief on much less.20 As a result, the courts are found applying the "special"
damage requirement in three ways: to require complete specification of transactions and customers lost;" to require a showing of loss of business following the
disparagement;- to require only what the exigencies of the situation will
permit.23

Disparagement like defamation involves the utterance of words intended to
damage. But slanderous imputations affecting the plaintiff in his business,
trade, profession or office, are actionable per se.2 4 "The likelihood of 'temporal'
damage in such a case is sufficiently obvious.... The object ... is to protect
the plaintiff in his office or calling... . ,,2S Thus it is actionable witlout proof of
damage for a tradesman to be falsely accused of insolvency or a professional of
incompetency2 6-- "since these things obviously discredit him in his chosen
calling."'27 Yet neither court nor commentator fully recognizes the proximity of
19Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W. 2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App., r928), modified
64 S.W. 2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933); see Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery
Laboratories, 17 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8th, 1926); Craig v. Proctor, 229 Mass. 339, 118 N.E. 647
(1918).
20 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 855, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 692 (i944),
rev'd 53 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (2945), but affirmed 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E. 2d 4o (i945). In the Pendleton case the majority said by way of dictum that if allegations of special damage were required,
the allegations of the instant complaint were sufficient. Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App.
i88, i96, 89 N.E. 2d 435, 439 (i949). This despite the fact that not even loss of business was
specifically alleged. For an acute discussion of the ambiguity of "special" damage see Bower,
Actionable Defamation, art. 13, note (p), wherein the term actual damage is adopted in place
of the "either meaningless or misleading" term "special" damage.
2 Cases cited note 17 supra.
- Cases cited note ig supra. This is apparently the English rule; see Bower, Actionable
Defamation, art. 13 note (u) (i9o8). McCormick on Damages

422

(1935) indicates that

Ratcliffe v. Evans is good law in American courts where "special" damage to custom through
general loss in business is alleged. But the weight of authority appears contra; see cases cited
note
23

supra.
Cases cited note 17 supra.

24

Prosser, Torts § 92 (1941); Bower, Actionable Defamation, art. 12 (i9o8); Salmond, Law

27

of Torts §§ r32,

147

(6th ed., 1924).

Prosser, Torts 802 (94). The reason behind the categorizing of slander affecting one in
his trade as actionable per se is rarely articulated. It seems probable that as in the other per se
categories, i.e., serious crime, loathsome disease, unchastity, the imputation was simply viewed
as such that damage was "bound to result." The general attitude toward defamation distinctions is that, "The basis and origin of the demarcation is... historical and not rational or
doctrinal." Bower, Actionable Defamation, art. 12 note (a) (igo8).
26 Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., 11 Ind. App. io, 55 N.E. 2d 382 (r944); DeSeversky v.
5
P. & S. Publishing, 3 4 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (2942); Kitograd v. Shapiro, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 959 (1943);
Diamond v. Krasnow, 136 Pa. Super. 68, 7 A. 2d 65 (2939); see Salmond, Law of Torts §§ X32,
247 (6th ed., 2924); Prosser, Torts 802-4 (194); Bower, Actionable Defamation, art. r2 note
() (19o8).
27 Prosser, Torts 8o3 (2941).
2S
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this wrong to that of disparagement, where, if the work or product of the tradesman be falsely accused of defect, "special" damage need yet be proven. 2 Assuredly, in the one case and in the other, the words just as "obviously discredit
him in his chosen calling." Recognition of the similarity between imputations
of disparagement and slanderous imputations affecting one in his trade is forestalled by the irreconcilable requirement of strict proof of damage for the one
and the legal presumption of damage for the other. Yet the proximity of the
actions cannot realistically be denied. To be sure, it is generally realized that
"the principles of law applied to the disparagement of the thing are... closely
analogous to those applied to the defamation of the person."29 But it is claimed
that disparagement does not "involve any injury to the reputation of a person
at all, and since this element is of the essence of defamatory matter, it is dearly
not defamation."'3 The concepts are blurring the facts, for if it can be maintained that slander affecting one in his trade is defamatory because injurious to
reputation, it must be conceded that disparagement is similarly defamatory.
In both cases it is the business or trade that is affected, and in both cases, if
reputation be injured at all, it is the trade reputation that suffers.3y The only
distinction is that disparaging words are directed at the plaintiff's trade while
slanderous words are directed at plaintiff "in the way of his trade." 2 It would
2"Hopkins Chemical Co. v. Read Drug & Chemical Co., 124 Md. 210, 92 AtI. 478 (1914);
Victor Safe &Lock Co. v. Deright, 147 Fed. 211 (C.A. 8th, ioo6); General Market Co. v. PostIntelligence Co., Inc., 96 Wash. 575, 165 Pac. 482 (1917); Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co., 144
Mass. 258, io N.E. 8og (1887); see cases cited notes 34, 37 infra where the courts have difficulty distinguishing words disparaging the trade and words defaming the tradesmen. There is
good reason for this difficulty, as is further indicated by this passage from Bower, Actionable
Defamation at 28-29 (io8) where the requirement for the trade slander category are explained: "The slanderous matter must be published of the party defamed, not only in the way
of his trade or calling, but also so as to affect his reputation therein... and the meaning of this
latter requirement is that the words must impute something which, if true, would have a natural tendency to injure the plaintiff in the occupation in question .... "
9 Bower, Actionable Defamation, art. 57, note (p) (igo8).
30 Ibid., at art. 6i, note (y).
31This is apparently recognized in the English Report of the Committee on the Law of
Defamation (Cmd. 7536/48). See Faulks, Report of the Committee on Defamation, 98 L. J.
6i (1948). ".. . it is recommended that in cases of malicious but not defamatory falsehoods
causing damage known generally but vaguely as 'actions on the case,' the law, which at present
always requires proof of special damage, should be amended to make actionable per se... (b)
such statements, however published, if they were calculated to cause actual pecuniary damage

to the plaintiff in his office, profession or trade."
3 Even this distinction becomes untenable in the case of disparagement or defamation of
a corporation. Corporations have no reputation in any personal sense, yet have prestige and
standing which may be injured. Thus imputations casting aspersions upon the honesty, credit
or efficiency of corporations have been held defamatory, Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening
Post Co., 169 Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916); St. James Military Academy v. Gaiser, 125 Mo.
517, 28 S.W. 851 (i894). Analytically only disparagement of such bodies is possible and

courts generally demand allegation and proof of "special" damage. See cases cited notes 17,
28 supra.
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seem that a requirement of strict proof of damage on the one hand, and a presumption of damage on the other, ought not hinge on such a distinction. Indeed a more tenable alignment would shift the presumption of damage to the
case of disparagement, since the injury to trade relations is here accomplished
more directly by derogating the trade rather than plaintiff in the way of his
trade.
When, in order to avoid the "special" damage requirement, counsel press on
the courts words disparaging the product as words defaming their producer,
both courts and commentators perceive difficulty.33 In such cases the disparaging words as to the product are urged as imputing deception or lack of integrity
to their producers. 34 If convinced, the courts will admit that the remarks are
not merely disparaging but defamatory, and, as libel or slander affecting one in
his trade, relief will be affordd--without the- onerous burden-of proof.3s In
such cases, the logic strippedlof-refinemen-woud-T appear thus:
D falsely stated that garments made by P are defective (mere disparagement
requiring proof of "special" damage).
But this implies that P is a cheat,
And since a cheat who makes garments will be viewed as making defective
garments,
P has been defamed in his trade (and damage is presumed).36
It would seem such gymnastics ought not be approved. Perhaps more deserving of approbation are those courts which, somewhat blinded by the lines of dis33 See

comments and cases in Prosser, Torts io38-4 o (1941); Hibschman, Defamation or

Disparagement, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 625 (194o); Prosser goes so far as noting, "It might be possible to imply some accusation of personal inefficiency or incompetence, at least, in nearly
every imputation directed against a business or its product."
34 Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 6og, 86 P. 2d 696 (1939); Shaw Cleaners
& Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932); National Refining
Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 2o F. 2d 763 (C.A. 8th, 1927); Erick Bowman Remedy Co.
v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8th, 1926); Dust Sprayer Mfg. Co. v.
Western Fruit Grower, 126 Mo. App. 139, 1o3 S.W. 566 (i9o7); Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co.,
12o App. Div. 387, 1o5 N.Y. Supp. 294 (i9o7); Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 45 S.E. 684
(i9o3); Inland Printer Co. v. Economy Half-Tone S. Co., 99 Ill. App. 8 (igoi); Non Pareil
Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey &Mattison Co., xo8 Fed. 721 (Pa., igoi); Freisinger v. Moore, 65
N.J.L. 286, 47 At. 432 (zgoo); Brooks v. Harison, 91 N.Y. 83 (1883).
3s Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 6og, 86 P. 2d 696 (1939); Summit Hotel
Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939); Larson v. Brooklyn Daily
Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4, 15o N.Y. Supp. 464 (19r4); Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 12o App.
Div. 387, 105 N.Y. Supp. 294 (19o7); Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820,45 S.E. 684 (903); Inland

Printer Co. v. Economy Half-Tone Supply Co., 99 Ill. App. 8 (igoi); Freisinger v. Moore, 65
N.J.L. 286, 47 AtI. 432 (9oo); Craig v. Pueblo Press Pub. Co., 5 Colo. App. 208, 37 Pac. 945
(x894); Landon v. Watkins, 6i Minn. 137, 63 N.W. 615 (1895).
36 Compare Freisinger v. Moore, 65 N.J.L. 286, 47 Atl. 432-(1900); Brooks v. Harison,
g9 N.Y. 83, 91 (1883); Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 6og, 86 P. 2d 696 (1939);
Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 12o App. Div. 387, 1o5 N.Y. Supp. 294 (19o7); Holmes v. Clisby,
ii8 Ga. 820, 45 S.E. 684 (1903).
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tinction, cannot tell the difference between words defaming the plaintiff in his
37
trade and words disparaging plaintiff's trade.
It has been indicated that if a disparagement action were viewed by the
court as slander affecting one in his business, the rigid demand of allegation and
proof of "special" damage would be displaced by the legal presumption of
damage. Similarly, if disparagement were viewed as libel, damage would be
presumed, for it is hornbook law that all libel is actionable per se. In disparagement there is no distinction between oral and written imputations. However,
since much disparagement is accomplished by print, many courts fail to distinguish it from libel as to the requirement of allegation and proof of "special"
damage. Looking to the question of whether the words are defamatory on their
face, as determinative on the damage issue, the courts lump disparagement and
libel requiring "innuendo" or "inducement" together, and require proof of
"special" damage as to both.38 Thus the requirement of allegation of "special"
damage has been substituxted for the requirement of allegation of "special"
facts in the "innuendo" libel situations. These courts are assisting many others
in a movement which threatens to obliterate that most basic defamation distinction between oral and written matter. Courts are today holding that if the
alleged libel is not defamatory on its face but Irequires explanation by "inducement" or "innuendo," it is not libelous per se but requires proof of "special"
damage. 39 Others have held imputations libelous per se only when falling into
one of the familiar per se categories of slander.4O Such distortion of orthodox
defamation law together with the discordant treatment of disparagement cases
indicate judicial dissatisfaction with the principles governing damages in
defamation.
The view taken by the majority in the Pndleton case avoids the requirement
of "special" damage but does not escape the problem. The dissent argued with
justification that the action was properly one of disparagement; that allegation
37 Compare Cohen v. Eisenberg, I73 Misc. xo8g, ig N.Y.S. 2d 678 (i94o), aff'd 26o App.
Div. 1014, 24 N.Y.S. 2d ioo4 (i94o); Henkle v. Schaub, 94 Mich. 542, 54 N.W. 293 (1893);
Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 96 Fed. 68r, 687 (C.C. Nev., I899) aff'g 88 Fed. 873 (i898); Gardella
v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. 2d 89r (C.A. 2d, 1937); Carroll v. Paramount Pictures, 3
F.R.D. 95 (N.Y., 1942).
38 See Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400 (z936);
Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 6og, 86 P. 2d 696 (i939); Shaw Cleaners &
Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 2X5 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932); National Refining Co.
v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 2o F. 2d 763 (C.A. 8th, 1927); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v.
Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8th, 1926); Dust Sprayer Mfg. Co. v. Western Fruit Grower, 126 Mo. App. x39, xo3 S.W. 566 (1907); cf. Advance Music Corp. v.
American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 645, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 287 (r944).
39 See the many cases cited in Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other
States, 17 So. Calif. L. Rev. 347 (i944); Burke, Libel Per Se, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 6i (1925).
4oRachels v. Deener, 182 Ark. 931, 33 S.W. 2d 39 (i93o); Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670,
103 So. 842 (1925); Landati v. Stea, 44 R.I. 303, 117 Atl. 422 (1922); Tennessee Coal, Iron &
Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348, 50 So. ioo8 (r9o9); Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325
(i9o8); see Carpenter, op. cit. supra note 39, at 355-56.
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of "special" damage was required but insufficiently set forth in the pleadings.4'
But the majority viewed the issue of "special" damage as foreign to the case,
relying on Tuttle v. Buck42 and Doremus v. Hennessy43 to sustain the action as
malicious interference with the property right of doing business.44 There is
some support for application-of-this-heory-to the Pendleton situation, but the
scant precedent is further weakened by the confusion that attends it.4s Yet, a
similar approach to actions of disparagement is preferred by commentators
dissatisfied with the existing law of defamation.46 They advocate considering the
tort as simply one form of interference with economic relations.47 But with
courts so disinclined to talk in terms of the interference with such intangibles,48
it is almost certain that talk of "property" would multiply,49 dispute as to the
requirement of "special" damage increase,SO and the troublesome concept of
"malice" lend its weight to the confusion.
Throughout that area of law affording redress for injurious words, the rules
as to allegation and proof of damage emerge as ultimate arbiters of award or
denial of relief. When these rules come to be viewed as essentially arbitrary
they can only be attacked and broken by commentators and courts.s' And
Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 III. App. 188, 89 N.E. 2d 435 (1949).
42 107 Minn. i45, ug N.W. 946 (igog).
43 176111. 6o8, 52 N.E. 924 (i898).
4'

44 Pendleton

v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. z88, 89 N.E. 2d 435 (1949).
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 855, 5i N.Y.S. 2d 692
(1944), rev'd 53 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (1945), aff'd 296 N.Y. 79, 7o N.E. 2d 4oi (1946); Stebbins v.
Edwards, ioi Okla. 188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924); Adriance Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co.,
121 F. 827 (C.A. 2d, 19o3); Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139
N.E. 655 (1923); cf. Al Raschidv. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 4, igr N.E. 713, 714 (i934).
46Prosser, Torts 1037 (194i); Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 Col. L. Rev. 121,
4SSee

129-31 (1913).

47 Prosser, Torts 1o49 (194); Green, Relational Interests, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 29-45 (1935);
see Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 Col. L. Rev. 121, 130-32 (1913).
48 Courts cling to the old concepts even when recognizing "new" actions in the nature of
interference. This is doubtless the reason why disparagement cases are so full of "interference
with property" discussion. Similarly, in a related area, the leading case of Lumley v. Gye,
2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B., 1853), found the court speaking of the interference
with contractual relations as interference with property.
49 Ibid. "Property" seems to be the "tangible" concept capable of being spread to embrace
almost any intangible relation. It alipears undesirable in disparagement; see Prosser, Torts
1041 (I941). In Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582, 6 N.E. 717 (1886), defendant falsely represented that plaintiff would not publish a directory thereby inducing third persons to advertise
in and subscribe for defendant's directory, but no legal right of plaintiff's was held to have been
invaded since his intention to publish a directory was held not to constitute property.
soThe more courts view the action as malicious interference, the less will "special" damage
be required, and the greater will be the conflict with disparagement decisions. Compare in the
Pendleton case the majority (interference) with the minority (disparagement) where the sole
issue turned on whether "special" damage was required.

s' See criticism and proposals in Prosser, Torts 777-78, 803-9 (194); McCormick, Damages

46 (1935); Bower, Actionable Defamation 318-22 (igo8); Paton, Reform and The English
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though there is widespread agreement that the prevailing rules should go, there
is meager accord on those which should take their place. Much that is proposed
would simply retain the concepts but rearrange the categories.52 It might be
rewarding to explore the possibilities of abolishing the "general"-"special"
damage categories completely, rather than seek to realign them. If by so doing,
attention can be directed to all the facts comprising the injury rather than to
the words alleged to have produced it, then would the law have moved toward
realistic treatment of words intended to damage.

DISCOVERY OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES
The advent of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' has brought in its wake a renewed discussion of an old problem:
when should documents in the possession of the executive departments of the
government be considered privileged from disclosure?? The resolution of this
question involves not only the balancing of the respective rights and needs of
private litigants and the government in its various litigious capacities,3 but
also a delineation of the powers of the executive and the courts in an area where
their duties overlap.4
Law of Defamation, 33 111. L. Rev. 669 (i939); Carr, The English Law of Defamation, i8 L.Q.
Rev. 255, 388 (1902); Donnelly, Law of Defamation-Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L. Rev.
6og ('949); Committee on the Law of Defamation: The Porter Report, 12 Modern L. Rev. 217
(i949); Faulks, op. cit. supra note 31.
52 See for examples, Paton, op. cit. supra note 5i; Donnelly, op. cit. supra note 51; Faulks,
op. cit. supra note 31.
1 Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2072 (ig5o): "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor ... the court in which an action is pending may (i) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing... of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted... ." Rules 26-32, together with Rule 45 (b) and (d), authorize the issuance
of similar orders to persons not parties to the action; these orders are also subject to the defense of privilege. Park Ridge Corp. v. Elias, 3 F.R.D. 93 (1943). As for the use of other defenses provided by the Rules, in the context of government litigation, see Pike and Fischer,
Discovery against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1125 (1943); to this list
should be added the "work-product" limitation laid down in H1ickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(i1947).

For a general discussion of the discovery procedure, see Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery
in Operation, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (194o); Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery under

Federal Rules, 4i Mich. L. Rev.

205 (1942).

2United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 1, 37, 191 (C.C. Ky., i8o6).
3Recent cases suggest that the treatment of the government's claim of privilege might
depend on whether the government is acting in a sovereign or a proprietary capacity. See
cases cited note 46 infra.
4 See

text at notes I3-I5 infra.

